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YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
From Economic Inequality to Economic Freedom:
Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age
K. Sabeel Rahman*
INTRODUCTION

We live in a new Gilded Age. In the years since the 2008 financial crisis, it
has become increasingly clear that income inequality is widening dramatically,
and that social mobility and genuine economic opportunity are an illusion for
most Americans. Such economic inequality magnifies and interacts with chronic crises of structural racial injustice and persisting political dysfunction. The
urgency of this moment is reflected not only in the virulent exclusionary populisms resurgent on the right, but also in the wide array of social movements and
reform communities mobilizing on the left: from alternative labor organizing
among low-wage and "gig" economy workers; to new civil rights movements
working at the intersections of racial, economic, and political exclusion; to efforts at reforming our democratic institutions themselves. This project of challenging inequalities of income, opportunity, standing, and voice presents a central challenge for contemporary legal doctrine, practice, and scholarship. What
is the role of law in constructing inequalities and exclusions? How can law and
institutional structures be reconceived to create a more inclusive and egalitarian
society?
It seems obvious that this project would necessarily raise constitutional
questions. To understand the constitutional dimensions of contemporary
threats to freedom, inclusion, and equality, we must distinguish between two
modes by which constitutionalism can grapple with these questions. First, there
is what we might call "big-C Constitutionalism"-the constitutionalism of text
and doctrine, of the document itself and its interpretation by the Supreme
Court. On this familiar approach to constitutional law, battles for a more equitable and inclusive polity play out on the terrain of doctrinal and textual interpretation, seeking hooks in constitutional text and precedent to ground more
robust demands for equality and inclusion.
But there is a second mode of constitutional thought and argument, which
we might call "small-c constitutionalism."' This approach invokes constitution-
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alism in another, more literal sense. What are our most fundamental moral values-the values through which we aspire to constitute ourselves as a society? In
what ways ought these values constitute-as in, construct, structure, and
shape-our fundamental institutions of political, economic, and social order,
from Congress to elections to markets, to patterns of discrimination? Constitutionalism in this second sense is fundamentally bottom-up, broadening the terrain to encompass social movements and public philosophical appeals to moral
touchstones like "equality" and "freedom."' It encompasses arguments about
fundamental values and structure that may implicate not only judicial decisions
but also legislative and regulatory ones. These values may well be better and
more rapidly realized through statutory or bureaucratic policies, creating what
Cass Sunstein calls "constitutive commitments" enshrined in statutes and policies that have a higher moral stature for their fundamental role in structuring
our polity and economy: the Social Security Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act,
the Voting Rights Act, and others.'
In this mode of constitutionalism, the domain of constitutional text and
Supreme Court doctrine remain important, but are no longer the primary sites
of struggle. Rather than seeing courts as heroic vanguards, with this view, courts
are instead laggards. The real heavy-lifting may well be done in other arenas of

1.

2.

In this Essay, for purposes of clarity and conciseness, I have avoided the language
of "popular constitutionalism." The relationship between the notion of constitutionalism advanced here and the literature on popular constitutionalism is complementary, but requires greater elaboration than can be done here. I follow the
line of popular constitutionalist argument insofar as popular constitutionalism
makes a claim about the validity of legislatures, social movements, and ordinary
citizens taking charge of the project of interpreting constitutional text and meaning. This view of small-c constitutionalism echoes other efforts to shift the focus of
constitutional-level deliberation to the domains of legislation and regulation.
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) (outlining a framework for understanding

legislation and statutory change in terms of small-c constitutional deliberation
about our basic structures and commitments); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative
Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013) (exploring how battles over regulation in the administrative state can involve constitutional interpretation over
rights and structures, engaging a wider array of policymakers and social movements in constitutional deliberation). What I add here is a push for small-c constitutionalism to also entail efforts to define foundational moral concepts like freedom and equality in the context of changing socioeconomic conditions through
the work of social movements, public philosophy, and more technical efforts at legal and policy reform in cities, bureaucracies, legislation, and the like. Such constitutionalism need not take the form of rights claims, but can be framed in broader
public philosophical terms. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT:
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 4 (1996) (describing the concept of

public philosophy as the public debate over philosophical concepts and values).
3.

See generally ESKRIDGE, JR. & FEREJOHN, supra note 2; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT

MORE THAN EVER (2004); William E. Forbath, ConstitutionalWelfare Rights: A History, Critique, and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821 (2001).
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movements and public discourse, manifesting in local, state, or regulatory policy changes, and only later shaping the high politics of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Constitutionalism, in other words, should be thought of as a part of the
more diffuse project of moral debate and reform that starts on the outside
through movements and small-scale reform efforts, working its way in towards
federal and constitutional codification later on. Understood in this way, the
constitutionalism of text and doctrine does not supplant or drive social change.
Rather, it complements, magnifies, and deepens reform efforts, activated by and
responding to battles already underway at the level of public philosophy, social
movements, and local or regulatory reforms.
This Essay has two central goals, one substantive and one methodological.
Methodologically, I want to suggest that a progressive response to today's inequality crises requires such a small-c constitutionalist approach. This shift to
small-c constitutionalism is ultimately a catalyst for driving progressive social
change. It is not at all clear that either constitutional doctrine of Supreme Court
jurisprudence ought to be, or indeed ever was, the primary driving vector for an
egalitarian, democratic vision of our society. Indeed, the recent experience of
Supreme Court jurisprudence has been fraught for progressives. As a number of
critics have rightly noted, the Roberts Court has consistently exacerbated structural inequalities, evincing a kind of neo-Lochnerism. Just as the Lochner court
struck down progressive labor protections in the name of the freedom of contract and a presumption against regulations that promoted the interests of particular constituencies such as workers-who to the Court seemed to be a vested
interest rather than a group in need of regulatory protection 4-so too has the
Roberts Court promoted "free market" visions of politics and economics, for
example by loosening regulations on campaign finance and voting rights, considering First Amendment concerns about economic regulation, and asserting
freedom of contract by upholding arbitration clauses.' By contrast, as a growing
number of scholars are suggesting, we should understand the history of social
movements and legislative or regulatory reforms battling for economic opportunity and inclusion as a mode of constitutionalism. For these scholars, the task
of combating inequality is one of "constitutional political economy"-the project of interrogating and reforming the values and structures that shape our col4.

For a historical account of the Lochner court, see

HOWARD GILLMAN, THE

CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS

JURISPRUDENCE (1993).

5.

On the neo-Lochnerism of the Roberts Court, see, for example, David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 1-4 (2014) (situating the Roberts court in a broader critique of "neoliber-

al" valorizations of market- and consumer-choice views of freedom); Ellen D.
Katz, Election Law's Lochnerian Turn, 94 B.U. L. REV. 697, 706-09

(2014)

(critiqu-

ing the Roberts Court's election law decisions as undermining democracy based
on an implicit and narrow view of liberty); and Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court
v. America: How the Roberts Supreme Court Is Using the FirstAmendment To Craft
a Radical, Free-Market Jurisprudence, 23 DEMOCRACY, Winter 2012, http://
[http://perma
democracyjournal.org/magazine/23/the-roberts-court-v-america/

.cc/A78E-UA4P] (describing the Roberts Court's revival of Lochner-style reasoning
and its resultant exacerbation of economic inequalities).
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lective social, economic, and political life.' It is simply too much to ask of
courts and the constitutional text alone to bear the burdens of moral judgment,
persuasion, and policy innovation. By shifting our focus to public philosophy,
social movements, legislation, and regulation, we put courts in their proper role
as part of a larger ecosystem of actors, arenas, and institutions grappling with
social change.
Second, I offer in this Essay the beginnings of a substantive argument as
well, sketching what a progressive vision of constitutional political economy
might look like when tailored to the multiple and overlapping crises of social,
economic, and political inequality. The ongoing (small-c constitutional) battles
already under way between movements and policymakers over the changing
economy suggest the beginnings of a robust, progressive vision for constitutional political economy that advances a view of economic freedom suited for
our current moment. This Essay excavates and distills these implicit ideas into a
broader normative framework for economic freedom in the twenty-first century.
Any successful progressive moral vision for the new economy must ultimately meet several criteria. The Essay will engage each of criteria in turn. First,
we must develop a substantive moral vision that diagnoses the root problems of
inequality and unfreedom, and offers a moral alternative (Part I). Second, this
moral vision must translate into strategies that target the most central sources
of unfreedom and inequality (Part II). What structural changes and policies
must we push for in light of these moral values? Third, these reform imperatives
must be accompanied by a theory of social change (Part III). How can we go
about making this vision a reality? What are the relationships between law, advocacy, reform, and social movements? Finally, any such vision must offer at
least a partial account of where progressivism goes wrong. In what ways does
this vision and approach to social change remedy not only flaws of our current
system but also limitations of previous attempts at progressive change? The Essay will conclude with some brief reflections on these final questions.
I.

DOMINATION, DEMOCRACY, AND

EcONomic

FREEDOM

The term "inequality" has catapulted to the center of progressive arguments

for reforming fundamental political and economic structures. Popularized by
the Occupy Wall Street movement and intellectualized by the firestorm of interest around Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century, it has been

absorbed by progressive reform candidates like Mayor Bill de Blasio in New

6.

See Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming ConstitutionalPoliticalEconomy:
An Introduction to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality, 94
TEX. L. REV. 1287 (2016); Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy
Constitution,94 B.U. L. REV. 669 (2014); K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democra-

cy, and ConstitutionalPolitical Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth
Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2016) [hereinafter Rahman, Domination]; Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional
Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1445 (2015).
7.
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York and Senator Bernie Sanders, even shaping much of Secretary Hillary Clinton's recent campaign rhetoric. But inequality and its implied positive alternative, equality, do not in fact capture the moral challenges of this New Gilded
Age. Rather, inequality is ultimately about more than just disparities of income.
The narrowing of economic wellbeing and opportunity arises from deeper,
more systemic changes in the very structure of work, markets, and geographies
that limit the kinds of mobility, opportunity, and welfare reachable by most
Americans. Rather than focusing on inequality in its narrow sense, then, we
must address these structural dimensions of inequality. This in turn suggests the
need for a different set of guiding moral concepts: the problem of domination,
and the positive value of agency.'
Domination refers to the concentration of arbitrary, unchecked power that
constrains the agency and capacities of individuals and communities. 9 Domination is the morally troubling condition of being subject to another's will: even if
the other entity treats you well, you remain subservient and therefore unfree.
The paradigmatic manifestation of domination arises in the history of republican political philosophy around the problem of the master and slave. Even a
benevolent master possesses the capacity to arbitrarily interfere in the life
chances and autonomous choices of the slave, such that even a well-treated
slave remains deeply unfree. In classical republican thought, the concept of
domination was readily applied to the dangers of unchecked power of the
state.'o But domination also arises in the context of the concentrated power of
private actors. Thus a modern theory of domination must see the need for
checks and balances not only on government actors, but also on private actors
like corporations, where owners and managers can dominate workers and
where monopoly firms can dominate other firms. Domination can also exist in
more diffuse structural contexts where there are many dominators rather than
one single dominator. A quintessential example of this more structural form of
domination can be found in patterns of discrimination and unequal economic
opportunity: in both cases, there may not be a singular, discrete dominator. Rather, it is the aggregation of a myriad of policies, activities, and transactions that

8.

The discussion in this Part offers a condensed version of an argument that I have
presented elsewhere. See K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION
(2016) [hereinafter RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION]; Rahman, Domination, supra note 6, at 1337-44; K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy Against Domination: Contesting Economic Power in Progressive and Neorepublican PoliticalTheory,
CONTEMP. POL. THEORY (2016).

9.

PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1997)
[hereinafter PETIT, REPUBLICANISM]. There is a rich and growing literature on the
philosophical and historical foundations of domination as a moral framework for
progressive politics, although it should be noted that there are extensive debates
about how precisely to formulate the concept. See, e.g., ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM
SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH: LABOR AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2015); PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS: A
REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY (2012); Patchen Markell, The Insufficiency ofNon-Domination, 36 POL. THEORY 9 (2008).

1o.

See PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supranote 9.
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combine to significantly narrow the freedom and agency of minorities, or of
workers, or of the poor.
Domination as a concept captures a wide range of the moral harms in an
economically unequal society: the subjugation of workers to corporations, of
the public as a whole to monopolies and "too-big-to-fail" banks, and the ways
in which diffuse patterns of discrimination or market structures might constrain individual and collective freedom.
Domination also suggests a more compelling set of constructive values with
which we can shape the projects of advocacy and reform. The alternative to
domination is freedom-the freedom for individuals and communities to have
agency, to shape their own lives, to have a shared voice in the governing and restructuring of social, economic, and political arrangements. The freedom that
domination threatens-the freedom we must seek to realize-is much more
than the libertarian freedom of consumer choice and market transaction that
animates conservative visions of "free" markets, limited government, and Lochnerian notions of constitutional jurisprudence." Rather, it is the richer freedom
to live lives we each have reason to value, a freedom that is expanded with our
capacities and capabilities to have real agency in the world. In short, it is the
freedom of being an agent, capable of authoring one's own life and coauthoring collectively our shared political, social, and economic life. This is the
freedom that is constrained by the accumulation of unchecked power, whether
by the state, the corporation, or the market itself.
The antithesis of our inequality crisis, then, is not more equality in the narrow sense of income redistribution. Rather, if the real problem is one of domination-arbitrary, unchecked power in the economy-then to overcome these
challenges we must do more to ensure that all Americans have real, meaningful
freedom to shape their own lives-and that means have a real voice, a real share
of power in economic, social, and political realms.
These concepts of domination and agency capture an important tradition
of radical political economy in American thought, from Thomas Paine to abolition, to elements of civil rights and economic justice movements of the War on
Poverty era." But it perhaps gets its fullest treatment in the reform discourse
arising from the crises of the first Gilded Age: the Populists, Progressives, and
labor republicans of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.13 For
these reformers, the problems of industrial capitalism were fundamentally
problems of domination: the domination of workers by managers and corporations; the domination of the public as a whole by the new monopolies and corporate titans of finance, oil, and railroads; and the more diffuse forms of structural domination arising from the legal structures of the market itself which
n1.

See GILLMAN, supra note 4.

12.

See, e.g., Aziz RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2010); MARC STEARS,
DEMANDING DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN RADICALS IN SEARCH OF A NEW POLITICS
(2010).

13.

See generally BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE:
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998);
GOUREVITCH, supra note 9; CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION (2007); DANIEL
T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998).
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condemned many to low wages. The myriad responses to the problem of domination were, at heart, efforts to reclaim a greater degree of political agency and
power for "we the people," whether through the creation of direct democracy
practices like ballot referenda and direct election of senators; or the organization and mobilization of individuals through the labor, suffrage, and consumer
rights movements; or the attempts to subject private power and the market itself to the public good through regulatory innovations like antitrust law and
public utilities.
II.

INEQUALITY AND

ECONOMIC

FREEDOM IN THE

NEW

GILDED AGE

This moral focus on the problem of domination and the value of agency
provides a framework for understanding, prioritizing, and driving forward key
fronts for progressive economic and social change in an era of inequality. The
ideas of domination and freedom also help distill and elevate the arguments
arising from the variety of economic justice and reform movements shaping today's political landscape.
A.

Curbing ConcentratedPrivatePower

The first frontier highlighted by the problem of domination is the threat of
concentrated private power. In June of 2016, Senator Elizabeth Warren delivered a headline speech calling for a revival of antitrust regulation and enforcement. 14 Antitrust, in Warren's view, was not just a technical matter of economic
efficiency or consumer welfare; rather it implicated fundamental values of freedom and democracy. "Consolidation and concentration," she declared, "are on
the rise in sector after sector. Concentration threatens our markets, threatens
our economy, and threatens our democracy."" Warren is not alone in this recovery of antitrust principles: Zephyr Teachout, another law professor-turnedcandidate, has made antitrust and the problems of new monopolies like Comcast and big agribusiness central to her work as a scholar and her campaign critique of an unfair and unequal economy.16 Warren's speech comes on the heels
of an upsurge of research and policy studies warning that the increased concentration of sectors from food to telecom has reduced competition, undermined
economic vibrancy, and extracted rents from consumers-in the aggregate,
contributing to inequality.17
14.

Senator Elizabeth Warren, Keynote Remarks at New America's Open Markets
Program Event: Reigniting Competition in the American Economy (June 29,
http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-6-29Warren
2016),
AntitrustSpeech.pdf [http://perma.cc/8FXA-3FWW].

15.

Id.

16.

See Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and PoliticalLaw: A Taxonomy of Power, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2014); see also Campaign Issues,
ZEPHYR TEACHOUT FOR CONGRESS,

http://www.zephyrteachoutforcongress.com/

[http://perma.cc/9WRH-N688].
17.

See, e.g., Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. (forthcoming
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Indeed, historically antitrust has been a key front-line for small-c constitutionalism. In an industrializing economy marked by vast new corporate powers,
antitrust emerged in the late nineteenth century as a key strategy for preserving
economic freedom against monopolies and oligopolies that would limit entrepreneurship, innovation, and competition, and extract rents from businesses
and consumers. Antitrust was also seen as a critical bulwark protecting political
freedom, by limiting the bleeding of concentrated economic power into political influence, hijacking the policy process to favor these corporate giants.'"
Nor is the problem of private power limited to the resurgence of classic
monopolies. New forms of private power also pose similar threats to opportunity and equality: whether in the form of Google's control over information and
search; Amazon's vast infrastructure for retail sales; Comcast and Verizon's battles against net neutrality and continued efforts to monopolize broadband access; and the spectacular rise of online platforms like Uber and Airbnb raising
implications for urban policy and access.' 9 The persisting anxieties about toobig-to-fail finance, and the threats of financial exploitation of consumers, businesses, and even cities reflect, a twenty-first century version of the old Progressive Era fear of "Big Finance" as the ultimate private threat to economic and political liberty.20
If concentrated private power represents one key front-line for combating
inequality and reviving economic freedom, what are the remedies? While there
is a jurisprudential element in the doctrinal treatment of antitrust statutes, the
key frontiers are in the realms of public philosophy-reclaiming the moral critique of private power-and the domains of statutory and regulatory change.
Indeed, many of the proposals for curbing private power today involve expanded regulatory oversight by agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, the
Federal Communications Commission, and financial regulators at the Federal
Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as legislative solutions." This is small-c constitutionalism at work: a moral critique highlight-

Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power, COUNCIL OF ECON.
ADVISERS (2016), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/2160414
cea competition-issuebrief.pdf [http://perma.cc/PPP4-P7JF]; Jason Furman
&

2017);

Peter Orszag, Presentation at "A Just Society" Centennial Event in Honor of Joseph Stiglitz, Columbia University: A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents
in the Rise of Inequality (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/page/files/2ol1016_firmlevel perspective on-role-of rentsinjinequality
.pdf [http://perma.cc/2PLD-84UG].
18.

See, e.g., THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS
(Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1935).

19.

K. Sabeel Rahman, Curbing the New Corporate Power, BOS. REv. (May 4, 2015),
http://bostonreview.net/forum/k-sabeel-rahman-curbing-new-corporate-power
[http://perma.cc/AP6Y-698K].

20.

See RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION, supra note 8, at ch.7.

21.

See, e.g., Warren, supra note 14, at 6-7 (proposing stricter FTC oversight of mergers and technology firms); Untamed: How To Check Corporate, Financial, and
Monopoly Power, ROOSEVELT INST. (Nell Abernathy, Mike Konczal & Kathryn
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ing structural threats to freedom in our economy, seeking remedies through the
interaction of social movements and legislative and regulatory bodies charged
with governing the economy.
B.

CounteractingDiffuse Market Power

The second form of economic power highlighted by the concept of domination involves not the discrete threat of concentrated private power, but the
more diffuse, structural inequalities arising from the market system itself.
Consider the following real-time movements. In an economy increasingly
dominated by low-wage, precarious work without benefits-in industries like
apparel, restaurants, and retail-a growing consortium of workers, organizers,
and communities have combined to push the Fight for Fifteen, to raise the minimum wage to $15 an hour." Meanwhile, organizations like the Freelancers'
Union have sought to establish access to basic benefits like healthcare and pensions for freelancers who operate in the "gig" or "on-demand" economy without the benefits that accompany full-time employment. The reality is that a
growing share of today's workers do not enjoy the benefits that, for much of the
twentieth century, accompanied full-time work, as a central component of the
moral social contract between business, government, and communities. This
erosion of the social contract is not just the result of corporate policy change;
rather, it stems from a structural shift in the organization of work-a shift with
which our public policies have not kept pace. Through outsourcing and franchising, many industries have shuttled their workers outside of the lead corporation, and are no longer responsible for providing these benefits, in a process
that economist and now-Department of Labor administrator David Weil calls
the "fissuring of the workplace.""
The social contract represents another manifestation of small-c constitutional battles over securing economic freedom for all. Through legislative and
regulatory initiatives, the social contract promises protection from economic
risk, enabling upward mobility. A key challenge for economic freedom today
lies in reinventing and expanding the social contract to ensure economic freedom given the changing nature of work-and to include constituencies long
since excluded from conventional labor protections, including women and
communities of color. The policy agenda here likely involves the creation of a
more portable and universally accessible approach to providing benefits like
pensions, unemployment insurance, and access to healthcare. 4 This means upMilani eds., June 2016), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/o6/

Untamed-Final-Single-Pages.pdf [http://perma.cc/C95M-SHP3].
22.

See

DAVID ROLF, THE FIGHT FOR $15: THE RIGHT WAGE FOR A WORKING AMERICA

(2016).
23.

DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME So BAD FOR So MANY

AND WHAT CAN BE DONE To IMPROVE IT (2014);

see also SARU

JAYARAMAN, FORKED:

A NEW STANDARD FOR AMERICAN DINING (2016); ROLF, supra note 22.
24.

On the creation of portable and universal benefits decoupled from full-time work,

see, for example, Nick Hanauer
DEMOCRACY,

Summer

2015,

& David Rolf, Shared Security, Shared Growth,
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/37/shared
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dating our statutory and regulatory frameworks for social policy. But it also requires making the public moral argument for a twenty-first century safety net,
in opposition to the push to trim or further reduce these benefits.
C.

Participation,Public Policy, and Democratic Social Change

The third frontier for an anti-domination approach to economic freedom
intersects with these first two. Government obviously plays a major role in enacting and enforcing the policies meant to secure economic freedom against
private and market power. But how do we ensure that governmental institutions themselves do so in ways that are responsive to the public's needs and aspirations? The answer lies in the centrality of democracy in driving these antidomination reforms to our economic structures. As the discussion above suggests, participation, social movements, and civil society actors are key to driving
the policies that would counteract economic domination-and mitigate against
the risk of unresponsive, unaccountable public power.
Indeed, in addition to policies that alter economic structures to minimize
domination by private actors or by market systems, the focus on domination
and agency suggests that we must also be mindful about political inequitiesabout disparities in how the state itself might respond to the needs and voices of
different constituencies. This is a major dimension of the current inequality crisis. We have a growing set of studies documenting the ways in which the U.S.
political process is empirically more responsive to the preferences of wealthier
citizens." Legislators may be dependent on campaign funders and donors.26
Elected officials may share a common socioeconomic or cultural background as

-security-shared-growth/ [http://perma.cc/77PL-NY9Y]; Common Ground for Independent Workers, WHAT'S THE FUTURE OF WORK? (Nov. 10, 2015), http://medium
.com/the-wtf-economy/common-ground-for-independent-workers-83f3fbcf548f
[http://perma.cc/U4YF-NBC6]; David Rolf, Shelby Clark &Corrie Watterson Bryant, PortableBenefits in the 21st Century: Shaping a New System of Benefits for Independent Workers, ASPEN INST. (2016), http://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content

luploads/files/content/upload/Portable Benefitsfinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/6VBE5VZT]; Shayna Strom & Mark Schmitt, Protecting Workers in a Patchwork Economy, CENTURY FOUND. (Apr. 7, 2016), http://tcf.org/content/report/protecting-

workers-patchwork-economy/ [http://perma.cc/GB9E-CAAF].
25.

See LARRY BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
GILDED AGE (2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE & INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I.

Page, Testing Theories ofAmerican Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564 (2014); Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels & Jason Seawright, Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON
POL. 51 (2013).
26.

330

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014).

FROM ECONOMIC INEQUALITY TO ECONOMIC FREEDOM

economic elites, leading them to favor more elite-friendly policies." Business
interests may be more effective in organizing as an interest group, particularly
in their investment in the ecosystem of lobbying, advocacy, and model legislation organizations leveraged to influence federal and state legislatures." The decline of organized labor may have accelerated this shift in the balance of power
among such lobbying and advocacy groups.' 9 Legislatures themselves may be
especially vulnerable to these disparities in lobbying influence, in part because
of their own declining resources-financial, human, temporal-to conduct independent policy research and draft legislation.30
The breadth of the problems of political inequality and unresponsiveness
suggests both the importance and limitations of efforts to promote campaign
finance reform and to expand voting rights. These are no doubt central fault
lines in the battle against inequality. But they must also be complemented by
innovations to make regulation and governance outside of the legislature more
inclusive and equitable. This represents another key domain for an antidomination-oriented approach to undoing structural inequalities.
Consider for example recent developments in local economic development
policies. Urban economic development carries with it the promise of redressing
structural disparities in economic opportunity and wellbeing. But a central
challenge in urban development is how to ensure that deals struck with developers over major new projects actually produce benefits for local constituencies,
whether in the form of hiring local workers or investing in community needs
like green space, schools, or affordable housing. Such community benefits are
often agreed to but later ignored, as developers capture or simply run roughshod over local government bodies. However, in response to organized grassroots pressure for more equitable urban development, some cities are creating
representative oversight bodies to address this problem. In Oakland, for example, a city-chartered oversight body, comprised of representatives from the developers and community organizations, monitors the massive redevelopment of
the old Oakland Army Base. This body not only provides a foothold of oversight power for all affected stakeholders, but also provides a forum for airing
grievances, thereby empowering community organizations and civil society
groups to bring claims where the developers are falling short of commitments.
This oversight body in a vacuum does not produce this power, but in combina27.
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tion with sustained community organizing in the area, it provides a critical forum and lever through which community groups can build and exercise countervailing power."
At the federal level, the early success of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) offers a similar example. Substantively, the work of the CFPB
speaks to the challenge of protecting individuals and communities from structural inequities and vulnerabilities in financial products markets. But in executing this mission the agency operates not just as a traditional expertise-oriented
regulator; it also works hard to engage the public in general, and consumer advocates in particular, to identify issues in need of policy solutions, in effect
channeling consumer interests in a regulatory ecosystem that often leaves ordinary people out of view. This focus is partly a result of statutory directives-the
CFPB has dedicated offices for outreach to and engagement with constituencies
that may have particular needs but are often overlooked in financial regulation
policy, such as veterans, students, and pensioners-but it is also a result of the
agency's personnel, character, and ethos, as many individuals working in the
CFPB are themselves veterans of the consumer rights movement."
If private power and market power pose threats to economic freedom, so
too does the unresponsiveness of the political institutions established to regulate, govern, and oversee the economy. A commitment to preventing domination and expanding agency implies a commitment to making such governance
more inclusive and responsive. In the electoral domain, the challenges of redressing disparities in voting rights, campaign finance, and lobbying influence
are familiar and necessary components of this focus on political inclusion. But
inclusion must also manifest in reforms to the many other institutions of dayto-day governance like cities, municipal bodies, and regulatory agencies.
III.

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND SOCIAL CHANGE

This brief accounting of the major front-lines for battling domination and
expanding democratic agency suggests a distinctive theory of change, one that
follows the lines of 'small-c' constitutionalism described earlier. The above discussion does not provide a blueprint of solutions, but it does offer a normative
framework for diagnosing the threats to freedom in today's unequal economy.
It also implies the distinctive elements of a small-c constitutionalist theory of
social change.
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First, in each of the front-lines described above of private power, market
power, and participation, we see the role of movements that prioritize public
philosophy and the battles over ideas and values as a key driver of social change.
This is constitutionalism as public philosophy, an effort to re-moralize our prevailing languages of economic and social policymaking, explicitly casting these
efforts not as technical matters of policy design, but rather as expressions of
fundamental values. Movements here are operating at the moral and constitutional level of values, not merely as policy advocacy. The technicalities of wages,
market share, or other facets are embedded in a broader narrative about dignity, inclusion, and freedom. The goal is to thicken our public commitments to
economic freedom.
Second, the policies proposed focus on altering the underlying structures
that allocate power in our polity, economy, and society. This is constitutionalism in the sense of "designing structures." Just as the Constitution itself seeks to
protect liberty by structuring governmental power through the separation of
powers and federalism, freedom in the New Gilded Age requires a similar attention to structuring power as it is manifest in the market-for example through
antitrust and market structure reforms-or in the polity-through a focus on
voting rights, campaign finance, and also the structures of other policymaking
institutions like cities, states, and regulatory agencies. This shift to a focus on
systems and structures is important, forcing us to push policy proposals that are
more than ad hoc reactions to symptoms rather than addressing root causes.
Third, these claims are primarily oriented towards legislative and regulatory
policymaking forums. Several scholars have argued for reclaiming the city as an
arena in which to incubate progressive policy change, as a springboard into
large-scale federal reform.33 It is no surprise that many of the efforts to contest
structural inequality and concentrated corporate power (such as in the cable
monopoly and municipal broadband context) have started to gain traction at
the city level. The administrative state and the regulatory process are also important forums in which these moral claims can become instantiated in the policies that structure our economy, as battles over net neutrality and financial reform indicate. 4 By broadening the set of target policymaking arenas, this view
of social change multiplies vectors for advocacy and policy innovation.
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We should note what is missing in this theory of change: constitutional
doctrine and courts. The rough sketch of economic freedom provided in Part I
could easily motivate a framework for progressive constitutional jurisprudence.
Anti-domination might be a moral value that animates doctrinal shifts to prevent the entrenchment of political power through gerrymandering or campaign
finance corruption,"s while suggesting an affirmative basis for a constitutional
right to a meaningful political voice-what Spencer Overton calls "the participation interest." 6 The thick conception of freedom suggested in Part I might
also resonate with debates in the aftermath of the marriage equality cases" to
consider what hybrid Equal Protection and Due Process dignity-based rights
might look like-an idea that has resonated with theorists of robust Fourteenth
Amendment rights of inclusion, standing, and equality."
These points of entry into constitutional doctrine are well worth exploring,
but ultimately their tractability is a product not of constitutional argumentation, but of the broader battle over the public philosophy and on-the-ground
public policies we develop in this New Gilded Age. As the marriage equality debate suggests, doctrinal changes can follow more readily on the heels of a
broader and longer-term movement to shift norms, values, and policies which
eventually can gain broader acceptance nationally and constitutionally. 9
Courts and constitutional interpretation remain important as deep reservoirs of moral language and public philosophy. The difference, however, is that
rather than targeting courts and constitutional interpretation as a way to shortcircuit the long pathways to changing norms, values, and ultimately policies, we
ought to engage this moral role of courts at a later stage in the process of social
change. We therefore engage the more familiar terrain of constitutional text,
doctrine, and interpretation as but one component of a broader ecosystem of
social change efforts-not to bypass the political process, but rather to provide
a point of entry for the public philosophical accounts of political economy that
gradually emerge out of movement organizing, advocacy, and policy experimentation at the state or local level.
This does not mean we abandon the moral force of constitutional rhetoric;
rather it means we take our constitutional claims-claims about fundamental
moral values and claims about the ways in which power is allocated and institutions are structured so as to comport with those values-into other terrains of
law and policy. This blurring of the lines between constitutional and other
forms of law diminishes the centrality of the constitutional text and the Su-
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preme Court even as it elevates the moral power and stakes of the legal and policy battles occurring elsewhere. It also opens up a more realistic and compelling
theory of social change, where progressive political economy is constructed over
time through a battle of ideas and values, through the "guerrilla warfare" of instantiating those values through changes in the law of markets and businesses,
and through the mechanisms of administrative agencies and local governments.
CONCLUSION

The many dimensions of a progressive account of economic freedom in this
New Gilded Age cannot be fully exhausted in this brief Essay. But the above
sketch indicates a number of key points. First, we must conceptualize the problem of inequality as a broader problem of freedom from domination, implicating
not only our most foundational moral values, but also the structures that literally constitute our social, economic, and political order. Second, in seeking to
reform these structures to redress inequities, we must focus particularly on the
threats posed by (i) concentrated private power; (ii) diffuse market power; and
(iii) unresponsive public power. This provides an agenda for substantive socioeconomic policy change, as well as for processes of policymaking that are inclusive and participatory. Third, the kinds of movements and policy reforms implied by this approach suggest a very different theory of change, pointing
towards a constitutionalism that prioritizes social movements, public philosophy, and statutory or regulatory policies rather than a narrow focus on constitutional text, doctrine, and judicial interpretation.
At the same time, a note of caution is in order. It is important not to subsume all good things into our preferred moral frameworks. While I am optimistic about the capacious notice and moral force of the anti-domination/freedomas-agency approach, I do not think that it necessarily encompasses all the familiar progressive and liberal policies of the last few decades.
For example, the New Deal social contract served many twentieth century
workers well, making pensions, healthcare, and other benefits contingent on
full-time employment. But not only did the New Deal order exclude many
women and minorities, it is also not clear that restoring this arrangement is
necessarily the best way forward in a rapidly changing economy. Perhaps we
need to depart from the work-based model of social insurance altogether. A
domination-reducing, freedom-enhancing social contract for the twenty-first
century may well look very different, perhaps departing from work-based models of social insurance, providing a thicker defense for the moral value of leisure
and work flexibility in a world marked by freelancers, contingent workers, and
fissured workplaces.
Similarly, we may have to reject our familiar attraction to presidentialism,
centralization, and expertise as the primary modes of governing economic arrangements, in favor of a more decentralized, messy, but ultimately democratic
view of politics. Indeed, I would argue that twentieth century liberalism has
generally combined two impulses: first, an unease with overtly moralized foundations for law and public policy; and second, an infatuation with managerialism and economic expertise. In a world where law and policy are primarily the
products of elite judges or expert regulators, it makes sense to shift from the
moralized and democratic register of public philosophy and social movements
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to the more rarefied, apolitical register of law and expertise. In both cases, liberalism has fallen into the siren call of neutrality, the neutrality of process and the
neutrality of expertise, both of which promise seemingly objective and incontrovertible foundations for liberal policy prescriptions, but neither of which
can, by themselves, provide the necessary moral persuasion or justification for
those policies. A progressive political economy founded on the problem of
domination and the affirmative value of freedom as agency provides a more
openly moral foundation for the kinds of progressive social change we hope to
achieve. 40
The point is that we have to resist the impulse to make our account of progressive political economy so broad that it absorbs all past, present, and future
liberal positions, to the point where it loses its own coherence, distinctiveness,
and moral force. Anti-domination and freedom-as-agency are, in a sense, timeless values with deep roots in our tradition. But in another sense, they are also
radical ones that have often been rejected in the history of American politics,
even among liberals. Given the scale of social, economic, and political crisis we
face today, it is more urgent than ever to look past the familiar comforts of topdown or depoliticized views of economic reform to recover a thick, moral account of economic freedom and domination of the sort sketched above. Such
an account may be controversial, but it also animates the very real social
movements working to reshape our social, economic, and political structures to
be more democratic, inclusive, and egalitarian. This is the kind of radicalism
that we should recover, and in which we should place our faith.
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